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Argument Against Counting Attendance

Here is a rough sketch of an argument I've been having some fun with. I always felt compulsory attendance at an institution that you pay a fee for is a little wrong.

Here's the argument:

P1: The point of a college course is for the student to have a thorough understanding/working knowledge of the material.

P2: A thorough understanding/working knowledge of the material is codified in a high grade (A).

P3: A high grade is based on a thorough understanding/working knowledge (From 1 and 2).

P4: If a high grade is based on a thorough understanding/working knowledge of the material, then no other factors can influence the grade.

P5: If no other factors can influence the grade, then attendance can have no influence.

P6: If a high grade is based on a thorough understanding/working knowledge of the material and only a grasp of the material, then attendance can have no influence (From 4 and 5).

P7/C1: Therefore, a high grade is predicated on a thorough understanding/working knowledge of the material, and not attendance (From 5 and 6).

C2: Therefore, it is wrong to lower a grade based on attendance. (From 6 and 7).

This is just the informal version of the argument. In time, I'm going to improve upon, and ultimately formalize it; so any constructive criticism is welcome.

Objections to Anselm's Ontological Argument

I promised a critique of Anselm's ontological Argument. Well, let's give it a try, shall we? I'm going to use the summarized version presented on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/ ).

Here's the argument:
1.It is a conceptual truth that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible being that can be imagined).

2. God exists as an idea in the mind

3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.

4. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (that is, a greatest possible being that does exist).

5. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)

6. Therefore, God exists.

I'm going to start with an obvious objection. Existence is not an attribute in the same way as "greatness" or "blue-ness". Existence is the precondition for these attributes to be ascribed to a referent. What Anselm is doing here is claiming that the attribute "Greatest being conceivable" entails the being existing, otherwise it wouldn't be great. The problem is we ascribe qualities like "Greatness" to objects that exist already. This is essentially a fallacy of equivocation regarding the idea of existence.

Another objection that can be raised is the fact that this argument conflates the idea of concepts with the idea of the object that is conceived. His argument, if correctly stated, would need to assert that the concept of God must exist outside of the mind for it to be greater than the being conceived in the mind; if this isn't done, it commits another fallacy of equivocation. We don't literally conceive of beings, but mental representations of said beings. (I don't want to get into a philosophy of mind debate regarding the idea of mental representations. This is for the sake of simplicity.)

I could go on with the objections, but it seems pointless at this point. Two of the premises are flawed, so the argument is impotent.

Summary and Analysis of The Crito

(This is a short essay I wrote a while back. I will re-read the Crito and add things that I most likely missed.)

The Crito is a dialogue written by Plato in which Socrates is met by a friend, Crito. Crito meets Socrates in his prison cell where he is awaiting execution. He has come to persuade Socrates to escape from his cell. There is a brief opportunity for Socrates to make his escape, since Athens was engaging in an annual religious mission/ceremony to a small Aegean island of Delos. The island was sacred to Apollo, one of the Gods in the Greek Pantheon. All executions were halted during this mission, so Socrates had to wait in jail for a month. When Crito arrives, the ship has arrived at Cape Sunium in Attica, which means that it would be arriving in Athens very soon. Crito attempts to persuade Socrates to escape and he presents several arguments to convince him.

Crito’s first argument basically says, “the opinions of many would judge us wrong if we didn’t help you”. Socrates explains that some opinions are right and some are wrong; he then says that it is not just a matter of opinion, but of correct opinion. The truth of the matter is the authority in this case. Socrates creates a dichotomy between true opinion and false opinion.

The second argument Crito poses is an ethical dilemma. If Socrates stays then he is aiding his captors in harming him unjustly which would, in turn, make his actions of staying unjust. Also, he would be abandoning his sons and leaving them fatherless. Socrates replies to this argument by explaining the Law of Athens. Socrates saw the Law as one entity, and if somebody broke one law they’ve broken all laws. Socrates explains that the citizen is bound to the law as a child is bound to his or her parents. Socrates poses a near-metaphysical “social contract” of sort; rather than break the Law and attempt to escape, Socrates wanted to rationally argue his case and hope the Law would treat him justly and let him go. Since the Law stated that Socrates was guilty and must be put to death, he must see this as just and right since, up to now he has seem everything else the Law has done as just and right. Socrates thought that if one was to live in Athens, one ought to adhere to the Law. He believed that if he were to break the Law by escaping, he would be acting unjustly and failing at his duty to uphold the Law. As a citizen of Athens, Socrates saw his duty and his own self as one. His identity as a citizen of Athens defined who he was as a person, and if he was to break the Law of Athens, he would never be welcome in another civilized society for the rest of his life. Socrates believed that if he was to break the Law, he would also be judged harshly in the Underworld, Hates.

The Hiker Dilemma (Version One)

Imagine you're on a camping trip with some family members. You're with your spouse, your three children (ages 3, 5 and 6) and your spouse's elderly parents (both of whom are lifelong camping aficionados). You all plan to camp in a small hunting cabin deep in the woods. The group arrives early in the morning. You spend all day setting up the cabin and surveying the property. It is at this point that you realize you forgot to inform your family back home of the specific location of this cabin, but you shake off the worry. "They know we're camping, that should be enough" you think to yourself.  That night, a freak blizzard occurs; it's fine though, since you brought enough food for several days. You spend the next day waiting for the blizzard to eventually let up, but it only gets worse. As you all prepare for bed, a loud knocking is heard at the front door. You open the door to find a nearly frozen hiker. As you let the hiker in he informs you that he was out hiking the previous day and got caught in the storm. He asks to wait in your cabin until the storm lets up, and you say "O.K.".

Several days have now gone by, and things are only getting worse. You have a small radio with you, and with it you pick up a local news report. The reporter claims that all trails and roads in the area are impassable due to the blizzard, and travel is impossible for the time being. You start to worry, since you are running dangerously low on food. There is only enough food to last for another day or two. You check the radio the next day and the reporter explains that the area is now in a state of emergency, and no help could make it to any of the several major car accidents, much less search for lost hikers and campers. It is at this point that you notice the hiker has a small revolver in his pocket. He explains that he always brings it on hikes, for personal safety. Another day goes by and the storm finally begins to let up, but the radio reporter explains that there is a massive freeze coming, and the situation will only get worse. There is now no food and no chance of a rescue anytime soon. Your children are starting to get extremely hungry. The next day comes, and there indeed is a massive freeze. Everyone in the cabin is now extremely hungry, as the food ran out two days earlier. This is when the hiker suggests the unthinkable. "Maybe we should consider something rash, for us to survive. We might need to put one of these elderly folks down, for the rest of us to eat", he says. Now things are grave. Everything is frozen over, and everyone is in a state of semi-starvation. Your children are looking very ill, and the hiker continues to insist on eating. The hiker now demands that you kill the two elderly people so the rest of the group can live. Your spouse's elderly parents say: "No, kill the hiker! We don't even know him!" The revolver is in your possession, since the hiker left it on a table the day he suggested his plan, and you quickly grabbed it for fear of his doing something crazy. You are now in a serious dilemma. You could:

A) Take the hiker's suggestion and consume the two elderly people, to buy enough time for a possible rescue. (They've lived long lives. Besides, the children need food.)

B) Take the elderly members' suggestion and eat the hiker. (You don't even know him. Besides, he isn't family.)

C) Try to wait for help. Keep the peace with the revolver, and hope help comes before starvation does. (But the probability of this happening is very low, according to the only evidence you have  <the radio news reports> .)

So, what do you do?

(Any extra ideas will be welcome; just add them to the comments section).

The Pharmacist's Dilemma

I'm going to come up with a thought experiment for you. Imagine that we are on a very remote island off the coast of Maine (it doesn't matter which island, just pretend this is the most remote, yet still inhabited island off the coast of Maine). There is a horrible storm going on and it is supposed to last for several more days. Contact with the mainland is cut off and no boats or small planes can risk coming to the island. Let's now suppose that you have only a limited amount of antibiotics, and there is no way for you (The Pharmacist) to get any more antibiotics until the storm ends and shipments can continue. Now, four people walk into your pharmacy, two male adults, each with his young son (for simplicity's sake, both sons are the exact same age). Both children have the same infection (this infection has been going around the island for the past few weeks) that can easily be knocked out with antibiotics. However, if left untreated, this infection is usually fatal. The two fathers who both came into the drug store at the exact same time have prescriptions from local doctors on the island. Both sons are very ill, and each equally needs the medicine to pull through. There is a problem though; you (The Pharmacist) only have enough of the antibiotic for one person's treatment. Each father needs this medicine to save his gravely ill son. The one father is obviously very affluent, as he offers both the necessary insurance copay as well as 10,000 dollars in cash. The other father is obviously very poor, and has neither the copay or any extra cash to offer. The pharmacist is in a very tough dilemma. He has only enough medicine for one of these children, and the time it would take for the storm to end and more antibiotics to be brought over would be enough time for the second child to die from his infection. The poor father continues to beg for you to save his son's life, and the rich father continues to offer you this large amount of cash.  What should The Pharmacist do and why?

Let's Get Political

Analysis of Rick Santorum’s Positions

Pennsylvania ex-senator Rick Santorum is attempting to win the presidential primary for the Republican nomination. He is a very staunch neoconservative as well as a hardcore pro-lifer. He is very religiously motivated and is against gay marriage in every form. My main concern with Rick Santorum is his horrible stance on abortion. My other concern with Mr. Santorum is his hate speech against the LBGT community.


Mr. Santorum has made his position on abortion very clear. He wants abortion illegal, even in cases of rape. He made this view known in the August 2011 Iowa Straw Poll GOP debate in Ames Iowa.

Q: In June, you said, "I believe that any doctor who performs an abortion should be criminally charged for doing so." You would allow no exceptions for cases of rape and incest?

SANTORUM: You know, the US Supreme Court on a recent case said that a man who committed rape could not be killed, could not be subject to the death penalty, yet the child conceived as a result of that rape could be. That to me sounds like a country that doesn't have its morals correct. That child did nothing wrong. That child is an innocent victim. To be victimized twice would be a horrible thing. It is an innocent human life. It is genetically human from the moment of conception. And it is a human life. And we in America should be big enough to try to surround ourselves and help women in those terrible situations who've been traumatized already. To put them through another trauma of an abortion I think is too much to ask. And so I would absolutely stand and say that one violence is enough.


This is a very disturbing view with regard to abortion. Rick Santorum believes a rape victim should be required, by law, to carry a rapists baby to term, and raise the child. He might as well go the whole nine yards and force the rapist to pay fifty shekels to the woman’s father so he can marry her. This is an extremely draconian view to take in our modern society. Mr. Santorum seems to be letting his religious convictions cloud his rational judgment. He also seems to be clouding the issue by calling the fetus (or blastula, gastrula, etc.) a child. A child,
by biological definition, is a human between infancy and puberty. Only recently have religious zealots attempted to add some Orwellian doublespeak to our words with regard to redefining the word child to mean “unborn fetus”.


My other concern with Mr. Santorum is his hate speech against the LBGT (Lesbian Bisexual Gay Transsexual) community. Mr. Santorum likened, indirectly, homosexuality with “man on dog” behavior. This quote shows the full context of what was said. "In every society, the definition of marriage has not ever to my knowledge included homosexuality. That's not to pick on homosexuality. It's not, you know, man on child, man on dog, or whatever the case may be. It is one thing. And when you destroy that you have a dramatic impact on the quality. . .

If you were to actually break down that statement, he essentially put homosexuality under the same label as “man on child, man on dog” when he claimed that marriage was none of those things, in any society (Which is actually not the case).

So, Rick Santorum is a horrific choice for any type of position of power. It is evidently The case that Mr. Santorum allows his religious and personal, moral convictions to cloud his judgment with regard to other human beings’ basic rights over their bodies and life style choices.

An Atheological Argument from Necessity

The follow argument has been heavily criticized by some people I know (atheists and theists alike). However, I think this argument does something rather important; it creates a sort of Euthyphro Dilemma for certain types of apologetic systems. If you have an apologetic system (like some presuppositional systems) that takes Platonic Realism about the Laws of Logic seriously, then this argument does carry some weight. In very simplistic terms, it reduces to asking the question: "Is Creation logically consistent because God chose to make it that way, or did God make Creation logically consistent because he had to?" It also leads to a common inconsistency within some of these systems. Usually, they'll say the Laws of Logic are immaterial, abstract entities that are eternal (Platonic Objects). But then they'll go on to explain how God caused Divine Creation to occur, thus creating a Universe that behaves logically. The question raised has to do with whether or not that universe behaves logically because god willed it to be so, or it behaves logically because of those eternal, abstract entities called the Laws of Logic. If it behaves as such because of the Laws of Logic, then one ought to presuppose those before any rational discourse. If the Universe behaves logically because God willed it to be so, then could he have willed it another way? If not, why not? If he could have only willed it this one way, then is he bound by the Laws of Logic? If he is bound by the Laws of Logic, is he really Omnipotent (in the normal sense of the word) ? It almost seems like we can skip the middle man (if we suppose a Presuppositionalist Epistemological System), and go just presuppose these Platonic Objects (Laws of Logic). Anyway, enough of my rambling; here is the argument.

P1: Logical Laws are necessary.
P2: If theism is true, then divine creation obtains.
P3: If divine creation is true, then all in the universe is contingent to God’s act of creation, and     nothing in the universe is necessary.
C1/P4: If theism is true, then no Logical Law can be necessary or have a necessary part. (from 2 and  3)
C2: Theism is false. (from 1 and 4)

As I said earlier, there are many ways to critique this argument. I don't actually think it shows theism to be false; but I do think it opens up more areas for objection within the theistic worldview (presuppositionalist). You may be able to open areas of objection regarding their stances on the Laws of Logic being part of God's nature, and why God's nature is as such. You could probably also open avenues of critique regarding how they know which Logical Laws obtain in their narrative of Divine Creation.  (This is not a very strong argument; but it can raise a lot of questions regarding the coherence of their worldview.)

The Problem of Universals: A Platonic Solution and Aristotelian Criticism

The Problem of Universals: A Platonic Solution and Aristotelian Criticism

The problem of universals is a classic problem in philosophy; it concerns whether or not universals have an objective ontological status. Universals are general or abstract qualities, relations,properties, characteristics, or kinds that can be predicated on particulars. For example, a St. Bernard, a Yorkshire terrier, and a Beagle all share the universal quality of “being a dog.” The problem of universals has bothered philosophers since ancient times, and remains unsolved today (although, there are some accepted solutions that still require more refining, e.g. Conceptual Nominalism). Plato attempted to solve this problem, via Socrates; his theory of Forms, or Ideas, has influenced philosophers from antiquity to the present. Platonic Realism is one of the famous attempts at a solutions to the problem of universals; however, it has some fatal flaws.

I will lay out Plato’s general theory as accurately as my interpretation of the literature allows; after that I will describe the Aristotelian criticism of Plato’s solution.

In the Phaedo, Plato lays out some general concepts of his Theory of Forms. In this particular passage, Socrates is questioning Simmias with regard to the ontologically objective existence of the Ideal Form of Justice (the Just): What about the following, Simmias? Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself, or not? We do say so, by Zeus. And the Beautiful, and the Good? Of course. And have you ever seen any of these things with your eyes? In no way, he said. Or have you ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses? I am speaking of all things such as Bigness, Health, Strength, and, in a word, the reality of all other things, that which each of them essentially is. Is what is most true in them contemplated through the body, or is this the position: Whoever of us prepares himself best and most accurately to grasp that thing itself which he is investigating will come closest to the knowledge of it? Obviously (65d-66a).

Plato has laid out his position here with regard to universals; he has said that there are external universals, inaccessible by bodily senses, independent of the particular on which that universal is predicated. Basically, Plato is saying, for example, that the universal “bigness” exists as an immaterial entity, independent of the physical world. Since these entities are not accessible by our senses, they
must be immaterial. Plato seems to think that particulars participate in the form of X and receive the quality X that is shared between them; take, for example, this passage from the Phaedo: “Consider, he said, whether this is the case: We say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else beyond all of these, the Equal itself. Shall we say that this exists or not? Indeed we shall, by Zeus, said Simmias, most definitely” (74a-74b). In this particular passage, Socrates is explaining to Simmias that the Equal itself is not to be found within the equality of two particulars, sticks to sticks, but exists somewhere else, transcendent to each of these particulars.

Plato thought that universals were separate from the particulars that they instantiate in the physical realm, as is explained in this quote from the Phaedo: “I assume the existence of a Beautiful itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest” (100b). Plato felt that simply describing the characteristics of the universal observed within particulars was not sufficient in establishing an actual
model of the universal’s ontologically objective status, since the particular only participates in the universal insofar as it receives the universal quality X, as is evidenced in this passage:Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause? – I do. I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons – for all these confuse me – but I simply, naively, and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on
the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful (100c-100e).

Plato, in the above passage, is explaining that the qualities of the particular do nothing to explain the universal that supplies the qualities of the particular, because these are simply a result of the particular receiving the shared qualities from the ontologically objective universal, which is that quality in itself.
Plato’s Ideal Forms even encompass the realm of numbers. In this passage, Plato sets up a conceptual framework for a Platonic Realism of Mathematics: “As we were saying just now, you surely know that what the Form of three occupies must be not only three but also odd. – Certainly” (104d).

Aristotle, Plato’s student and successor, did not accept the concept of a Form existing in itself,and laid out a few devastating arguments against the idea of Platonic Forms. Probably the most devastating argument against Platonism would be the Third Man Argument. I will quote from Aristotle’s version of the Third Man Argument as stated in On Ideas:If what is predicated truly of some plurality of things is also some other thing apart from the things of which it is predicated, being separated from them (for this is what those who posit the Ideas [i.e. Forms] think they prove; for this is why, according to them, there is such a thing as man-
itself, because the man is predicated truly of the particular men, these being a plurality, and it is other than the particular men) – but if this is so, there will be a third man. For if the being predicated is other than the things of which it is predicated and subsists on its own, and the man is predicated both of the particulars and of the Idea, then there will be a third man apart from
the particulars and the Idea. In the same way, there will also be a fourth predicated of this , of the Idea, and of the particulars, and similarly also a fifth, and so on to infinity (84.21-85.3).

(F stands for any Ideal Form):

1) Forms are one-over-many: For any plurality of F things, there is a form of F-ness by virtue of partaking of which each member of that plurality is F (Republic 596a).
2) Forms are Self-predicating: Every possible form of F-ness is itself F (Parmenides 132a-1-b2, 132d1-133a6).
3) Forms are non-self-partaking: No form partakes in itself (Phaedo 100c4-6).
4) Forms are unique: For any property F there is only one form of F-ness.
5) Forms are pure: No form can have properties that are opposite or contrary of the Form itself (the property of being one and the property of being many are contrary).
6) One-ness of Forms: Every Form is one in itself (there are not many forms for the Many, but one form of Many) (Republic 476a2–6 and 524b7–11).

Number four follows logically from number six; if something is one in itself, nothing else can be like it,so that thing is unique. Number five would then follow from number two; if, for example the Large is large (self-predication), then that thing (the Large) could not, logically, be small also. So, following from
the purity of Forms (number five), the one-ness of forms would indicate that one Form cannot also be many because being many would not be consistent with being one. After laying out Plato’s theory in this way, we can see that it contains some problems. Aristotle’s contention would go like this: If we have
three men, they form the plurality (M1,M2,M3) since they all partake in the universal human. The plurality would partake in the Form of human, which would be a perfect human, in itself. Now we have encountered the problem; this perfect human would have the aspect of human-ness, and since a Form cannot partake in itself (number three), we have to add this human to the plurality of (M1,M2,M3)
because he has the universal aspect of human-ness which he cannot receive from himself (number three). Now we have the plurality (M1,M2,M3,P1) which needs to participate in a Form to receive the universal “human-ness”, which would be a perfect human according to Plato. But we also have a third man that the plurality has to partake in; the problem gets worse, since this new “perfect human” must get his “human-ness” from somewhere, and he cannot get it from himself (number three), so there must be a fourth man where he gets his “human-ness” from. So, you add the fourth man to the plurality, (M1,M2,M3,P1,P2) and so on endlessly. The Third Man Argument basically reduces the Theory of Forms to a series of infinite regress because any plurality of things that receives their universal aspect from a form of the aspect-in-itself, must be added to the plurality because that aspect-in-itself (the perfect human) has to receive its aspect from somewhere other than itself (number three). A more concise and logical version of this argument comes from Parmenides; I will rephrase the argument and use the concept of a man (man-ness or human-ness), rather than “large-ness” to remain consistent with the above argument. Consider a plurality of men, A, B, and C. According to the principle of One-over-Many (number one), there is form of Man (let’s call it “M1”) which A, B, and C partake in. According to the principle of Self-Predication (number two), M1 is a man. So there is now a new plurality of men, A, B, C, and M1. Thus, according to the principle of One-over-Many, there is another form of “Man-ness” (Human-ness) (let’s call it “M2”) from which A, B, C, and M1 also derive their “Man-ness” from. Hence M1 partakes in M2. According to the Theory of Forms, no Form is identical to anything that partakes in it, the term used in Parmenides is Non-Identity, which is clearly stated in principles four, five, and six. Based on the fact that M1 partakes in M2, the principle of Non-Identity requires that M2 be numerically distinct from M1. Thus, there must be at least two forms of man, M1 and M2. But this is not all; according to Self-Predication, M2 is a man. So there is now a new plurality of men, A, B, C, M1, and M2. Thus, according to One-Over-Many, there is another form of “Man-ness” (Human-ness) (let’s call it “M3) which A, B, C, M1, and M2 also partake in. Hence M1 and M2 both partake in M3. But according to Non-Identity, M3 is numerically distinct from both M1 and M2. Thus, there must be at least three forms of man, M1, M2, and M3. Repetition of this reasoning will result in an infinite regress.

So, Plato’s Theory of Forms has a fatal flaw – namely, the infinite regress. Aristotle did not formulate this argument; he borrowed it from Plato’s dialogue Parmenides. Plato actually subjected his own theory to one of the harshest self-criticisms that the philosophical world has ever seen. In the dialogue Parmenides, a young Socrates is being questioned by Parmenides with regard to the Theory of Forms Socrates has just presented. What follows are a few of Parmenides’ objections, but the most note-worthy is the Third Man Argument (Parmenides 132a-1-b2, 132d1-133a6). The young Socrates has no rebuttal to any of Parmenides’ objections, but seems to remain rather puzzled over the conundrums they present. There are many other objections to the Theory of Forms, but the TMA (Third Man Argument) is the most famous, and devastating. Regardless of the flaws in Plato’s theory, he was one of the first philosophers in antiquity to address this problem and attempt to create a coherent solution. The problem of universals has plagued philosophy for millennia, and will probably continue to do so for many years to come.

My first blog post

This being my first post, I figure I ought to introduce myself. My name is John and I am a student of Philosophy and Religious studies. Currently, I am considering transferring universities, both for the change of location, and the change of philosophy department. My main areas of philosophical interest lie in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of science. There are many other areas of intrigue, but I feel that those listed above are on the top of my list. I hope to get some regular posts going over the next few weeks. I'll begin working on a critique of Anselm's Ontological Argument, and maybe even post some of my old term papers.